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This essay discusses how the growing literature on social interactions can be used in 
macroeconomics.  This new literature represents a systematic effort to introduce 
sociological reasoning into economic contexts.  Theoretical and empirical analyses of 
social interactions have proven valuable in understanding a range of aspects of individual 
decisionmaking and have been useful in understanding aggregate phenomena such as 
inequality.  We describe the basic ideas underlying social interactions models and 
speculate on how macroeconomics might benefit from incorporating this perspective.    
 
 
William A. Brock 
Department of Economics 
University of Wisconsin 
1180 Observatory Drive 




Steven N. Durlauf 
Department of Economics 
University of Wisconsin 
1180 Observatory Drive 
Madison, WI 53706-1393 
sdurlauf@ssc.wisc.eduPolitical economy…finds the laws underlying a mass of contingent occurrences. 
It is an interesting spectacle to observe here how all of the interconnections have 
repercussions on others, how the particular spheres fall into groups, influence 
others, and are helped or hindered by these.  This interaction, which at first sight 
seems incredible since everything seems to depend on the arbitrary will of the 
individual, is particularly worthy of note... 
 





  Within economics, social interactions research constitutes a growing area of 
study.  This research represents a good faith attempt to introduce substantive sociological 
factors into economic modeling.  As such, this work represents a significant departure 
from the sorts of market-mediated interdependences between individuals that one finds in 
general equilibrium theory.  While the substantive ideas underlying this work may be 
found in now classic papers such as Loury (1977), the modern social interactions 
literature is quite young.  Despite this, there are now an impressive range of applications 
of social interactions models in microeconomic contexts.  Examples of phenomena where 
empirical evidence of social interactions has been found include 1) crime (Glaeser, 
Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996), Sirakaya (2003)), 2) welfare and public assistance 
use (Aizer and Currie (2004), Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000)) 3) fertility 
(Brooks-Gunn et al (1993), Rivkin (2001)), 4) housing demand and urban development 
(Irwin and Bockstaed, (2002), Ioannides and Zabel (2003a,b)), 5) contract determination 
(Young and Burke (2001,2003)), 6) employment (Oomes (2003), Topa (2001), 
Weinberg, Reagan, and Yankow, (2004)),  7) cigarette smoking (Krauth (2003), 
Nakajima (2003)), 8) school performance (Boozer and Cacciola (2001), Graham (2005)) 
and even 9) medical techniques (Burke, Fournier, and Prasad (2004)).   
  While the importance of social interactions has been argued for a range of 
interesting behaviors, far less attention has been paid to the role of social interactions in 
aggregate phenomena.  The one partial exception to this claim is the use of social 
interactions to study inequality and the aggregate cross-section income distribution and/or 
dynamics of inequality (Bénabou (1996), Durlauf (1996)).  There has yet to be any 
  1systematic examination of whether social interactions may help explain the standard 
macroeconomic phenomena: growth and fluctuations, although elements of the existing 
literature may be connected to social interactions.  
In this paper, we attempt to accomplish two things. First, we review some of the 
theory and econometrics of social interactions. This part of the paper will represent a 
brief synthesis of a large literature; more extensive surveys include Brock and Durlauf 
(2001b) and Durlauf (2004).  Second, we consider how this body of work may be related 
to macroeconomics.  This discussion is necessarily speculative. Our objective is to 
stimulate further work on social interactions that moves the field towards the 
consideration of aggregate phenomena. 
 
 
2. Social interactions: theory 
 
i. A baseline model 
 
We first describe the general structure of social interactions models. We follow 
the approach we have taken in previous work (Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b,2004a,b)).  
Consider a group of I  individuals who are members of a common group g. Individual i 
makes a choice  i ω .  The description of the decision problem facing agent i is used to 
construct a conditional probability measure for  i ω  in which the conditioning variables 
reflect different individual and social influences on the choice.  The conditional 
probability measures that describe individual choice embody the microfoundations of the 
model.  The set of conditional probability measures for each individual is then used to 
construct a conditional probability measure for the vector of choices of all the members 
of the group, which we denote as  g ω . Equilibrium in a social interactions model may be 
understood as the consistency between the individual-level probability measures and the 
joint probability measure.   
In modeling individual decisions, there are four distinct factors that determine 
individual and, hence, group behavior.  Distinguishing between these factors is important 
  2both in terms of the development of the theory as well as its econometric implementation. 
These factors are: 
 
i X :  deterministic (to the modeler) individual-specific characteristics 
associated with individual i,   
 
i ε : random individual-specific characteristics associated with i, 
 




ig i µω − : a subjective probability measure that captures the beliefs 
individual   possesses about behaviors of others in his group.  i
 
Two of these factors,  g Y  and  ( ) ,
e
ig i µω − , capture how membership in a group affects an 
individual.   Following Manski (1993),  g Y  measures what are known as contextual effects 
and  ( ) ,
e
ig i µω −  captures what are known as endogenous effects; the key difference 
between the two is that endogenous effects capture how the behaviors of others in a 
group affect an individual whereas contextual effects capture how the characteristics of 
others in a group affect him.  The endogenous effect is typically determined by the 
equilibrium of the model whereas contextual effects are typically modeled as 
predetermined.  A typical endogenous effect is the expected average behavior of others 
whereas a typical contextual effect is the average of some individual characteristics of 
others such as age.  We model endogenous effects as beliefs rather than as outcomes, i.e. 
individuals are affected by what they think others will do rather than what they actually 
do.  By allowing beliefs to mediate endogenous effects, substantial analytical 
convenience is achieved.  The appropriateness of this assumption will depend on context; 
presumably for small groups such as friendship trios individuals know the actual behavior 
of others whereas for larger groups, such as ethnicity, beliefs about behavior are what 
matters.  
  3  While this abstract description of social interactions as either contextual or 
endogenous effects is useful for formal modeling, we should note that it obscures the 
actual mechanisms by which social interactions may occur.   Within the social 
interactions literature there has been interest in peer effects (in which individuals imitate 
others due to a direct utility benefit), information effects (in which the behavior of others 
provides information on the payoffs to a person’s choices), role model effects (in which 
the previous behavior of some individuals affects the current choices of group members), 
social norms (the emergence of rules by which individuals are punished by others for 
certain behaviors), etc.  There has yet to be much integration of these types of direct 
sources of interdependences in decisions into formal social interactions models; such 
integration would be quite valuable, particularly for questions such as counterfactual 
evaluation of policy.  
In our baseline model, individual decisions follow standard microeconomic 
analysis in that they represent those choices that maximize an individual payoff function 
, which, given the factors we have described means that each individual choice  () V ⋅ i ω  is 
defined by 
 
  ( ) ( ) , argmax , , , ,
i
e
i iig i g i VXY ω ωω ε µ ∈Ω − = ω . (1) 
 
The solution to this problem for all members of the group produces a set of conditional 
probability measures 
 
  ( ) ( ) , ,,
e
ii gi g i XY µω µ ω−  (2) 
 
which describes how observable (to the econometrician) individual-specific and 
contextual effects as well as unobservable (to the econometrician) beliefs influence the 
likelihood of the possible choices. 
  Under our assumptions, moving from the specification of individuals to group 
behavior is straightforward.  Since the errors are independent, the joint probability 
measure of decisions will equal the product of the conditional probability measures 
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  () ( ) () () ( ) 11 , 1 , , , , ,..., , , ,
ee e
gg g I I g I i ig i g i i YX X XY µ ω µω µω µ ω µω −− =Π − . (3) 
 
In order to complete this model, it is necessary to specify how beliefs are formed.  The 
benchmark in the literature is that the beliefs are rational in the sense that the subjective 
beliefs an individual possesses about others corresponds to the actual probability measure 
that describes those behaviors given the information available to the individual.   We 
assume that this information set is comprised of the deterministic characteristics and 
beliefs of others  j X  and  (
e ) j j µω − , so that subjective beliefs obey 
 
  () ( ) ( ) () ,, 1 1 , 1 , , ,..., ,
ee
ig i g i g g I Ig I YX X µω µ ω µω µω −− − = ,
e
− . (4) 
 
While recent developments in behavioral economics suggest the importance of moving 
beyond this notion of rationality in describing beliefs, the self-consistency embedded in 
(4) is a key baseline in understanding the properties of social interactions models. 
Together, eqs. (1)-(4) represent a complete description of behavior within a group. 
The main technical issues that arise in the study of such models is the demonstration that 
a joint probability measure exists which satisfies (3) and (4); the mathematical techniques 
for developing such proofs are discussed in Blume (1993), Brock (1993), Durlauf (1993) 
and Bisin, Horst and Ozgur (2004) and Horst and Scheinkman (2004).  One should also 
note early work by Föllmer (1974) and Allen (1982) which anticipated the modern social 
interactions approach.  These early papers are useful in making clear the links between 
social interactions models and models of statistical mechanics that appear in physics and 




  The interesting properties of social interactions models occur when these models 
exhibit strategic complementarities in behavior. The key idea underlying the notion of 
  5complementarity is that incentives exist to behave similarly to others. Formally, let 
high µ  
and 
low µ  denote two probability measures such that for any fixed vector ω , 
() ( ,
high low
ig ig ) , µ ωω µ ωω −− ≥≥ ≥; this condition means that higher values of  , ig ω−  are 
more likely under 
high µ  than 
low µ .  Let 
high low ω ω >  denote two possible levels of  i ω .  
The payoff function V exhibits strategic complementarities if 
 
  () ( )
() (
,,,, ,,,,
,, ,, ,, ,, .
high high low high
ii g ii g
high low low low
ii g ii g
VX Y V X Y
VX Y V X Y
ωε µ ω ε µ





Eq. (5) captures the idea that when others are expected to make relatively high choices, 
the relative attractiveness of a high choice is increased for each individual.     
  Complementarity in individual payoffs has important implications for the 
aggregate equilibrium in social interactions models.  The following properties are among 
those found in social interactions models.
1   
 
Multiple equilibria.  When complementarities are sufficiently strong, multiple equilibria 
can exist.  What this means is that more than one joint probability measure for the vector 
of choices  g ω  is compatible with the conditional probabilities that describe the individual 
choices.  Intuitively, complementarities mean that each individual has incentives to 
behave similarly to others, i.e. conformity effects are present.  When this conformity 
effect is sufficiently large relative to other influences, this introduces a degree of freedom 
in aggregate behavior: individuals in equilibrium behave similarly to one another, but this 
does not uniquely determine what they will do. 
 
Phase transition.  Phase transitions exist when small changes in a parameter of a system 
can induce qualitative changes in the system’s equilibrium.   Phase transitions are 
common in physical contexts.  A standard example in physics concerns the relationship 
between the state of water and its temperature.  When the temperature of water moves 
                                                 
1 This discussion borrows from Durlauf (2001). 
  6from slightly above   F to below   F, the water undergoes a transition from liquid 
to solid.  In social interactions models, phase transitions occur via the interplay of 
endogenous social interactions and other influences.  Suppose there is a parameter that 
measures the strength of endogenous social interactions; this is the case in Brock and 
Durlauf (2001a,b,2004a), for example.  When this parameter is zero, then the equilibrium 
is unique.  Suppose that when this parameter is infinity, all agents behave the same as one 
another, as the payoff loss from not doing so is unbounded, inducing multiple equilibria.  
Then as this parameter is increased from 0 to infinity, at some point the number of 





Social Multipliers.  Regardless of the number of equilibria, social interactions models 
will typically exhibit social multipliers, which means that the equilibrium effect of a 
change in  g Y  on individual  g m  increases with the level of complementarity in the system. 
The basic idea is that when there are complementarities in behavior, a change in  g Y  both 
affects each person directly as in (2) as well as indirectly, via the effect of the change in 
g Y  on the behavior of others, i.e.  ( ) ,
e
g i µω − , as captured in (4).   
 
These properties are not necessarily present in social interactions models, but typically 




3. Social interactions: econometrics 
 
  In this section we briefly review some of the econometric issues that arise in 
trying to bring social interactions models to data. Our focus will be on identification 
problems, i.e. the extent to which socioeconomic data can provide evidence of social 
interactions given alternate explanations for individual outcomes.  As such, we will 
review the main econometric work that has been accomplished for the study of social 
interactions. It is important to note that many outstanding issues remain, such as how to 
  7account for the lack of prior knowledge about the identity of the group which affects 
individuals in a given data set or how to allow for different strengths of interactions 
across members of a given group.  Manski (2000) discusses many such issues. 
 
i. identification and the reflection problem 
 
  The first difficulty in identifying social interactions concerns the distinction 
between contextual and endogenous effects.  Manski (1993), in a classic analysis, 
indicates how it may be impossible to disentangle these different effects in a linear 
model.  
  To see why this is so, consider the linear-in-means model of social interactions 








g m  denotes the subjective expected value of the average choice in group  .  
Relative to the general formulation above, this model assumes all endogenous effects 
work through this average.  For now, we assume that 
g
( ) ,, 0 ii g EX Y i g ε ∈ = , so that the 
model residuals are uncorrelated with the model regressors and that no self-selection 
effects are present. 
As discussed earlier, under self-consistency, the subjective expected average 
















where  g X  is the average of  i X  across members of group  .  Comparing (6) and (7), it is 





 is linearly independent 
from  g Y , then one cannot distinguish between endogenous and contextual effects.  Put 
  8differently, endogenous social interactions are linearly dependent on the contextual 
effects; this is what is meant by the reflection problem.  The reflection problem indicates 
the importance of prior information for identification in linear models.  For example, 
suppose that one does not have any basis for distinguishing individual and contextual 
variables, in other words, that a researcher has no basis for arguing that for certain 
elements of  i X  the corresponding values in the group average  g X  are not elements of 
g Y . Then, this would imply that  g g X Y = , so identification fails.  This is precisely 
Manski’s insight. 
  The reflection problem is specific to linear regressions.  To see this, following 
Brock and Durlauf (2001b), consider the nonlinear model 
 
  ( )
e
ii g g kc X d Y J m i ω λ =+ + + + ε  (8) 
 
where  () λ ⋅  is an invertible function with  0 λ′′≠ , i.e. the second derivative of the 
function is nonzero.  Defining  ( ) ( ) 1 J ψ λ ⋅ =− ⋅, the self-consistent expected average 
choice equals 
 
  ( )
1
g gg mk c X d ψ
− =+ + Y . (9) 
 
Even if  g g X Y = , (9) indicates that  g m cannot be linearly dependent on  g Y , so long as  g Y  
has a large enough support.  
Similar reasoning indicates why the reflection problem does not arise in discrete 
choice or duration data models, see Brock and Durlauf (2001b,2004a,b) for formal 
proofs.  This is straightforward to see for a discrete choice model where the expected 
percentage of individuals in a group that make a particular choice is the measure of 
endogenous effects associated with the choice. Because these percentages must lie 
between 0 and 1, they cannot be linear functions of  g Y . 
Relatively little work has been done on the estimation of nonlinear social 
interactions models; exceptions include Bisin, Moro and Topa (2002), Krauth (2004), and 
  9Sirakaya (2003).  This is an important area for future analysis if the identification results 
for such models are to be useful in practice and is ready to proceed given the results on 




  The assumption that  ( ) ,, 0 ii g EX Y i g ε ∈ =  is unappealing in contexts where 
group memberships are endogenous, as occurs in cases such as residential 
neighborhoods.  Following Heckman’s classic (1979) formulation, one can think of self-
selection as an omitted variables problem, in the sense that the appropriate linear 
regression model in the presence of self-selection is 
 
  ( ) ,, ii gg i i g cX dY Jm E X Y i g i ω ε =+++ ∈ + ξ . (10) 
 
It is easy to see why failing to account for self-selection can induce spurious evidence of 
social interactions. Consider the question of identifying social interaction effects on 
academic performance of students.  If relatively ambitious parents self-select into 
neighborhoods with higher student achievement, the failing to account for this self-
selection can lead one to the appearance of social interactions effects when none are in 
fact present.  The potential importance of self-selection is indicated by Evans, Oates, and 
Schwab (1992), who show that instrumental variables estimates of social interactions, 
designed to overcome self-selection, can eliminate statistically significant evidence of 
social interactions. Rivkin (2001), using similar instruments, produces an analysis in 
which the instrumental variables produce much larger evidence of social interactions than 
when instruments are not used.   We concur with Rivkin’s interpretation that his results 
show that it is problematic to identify valid instruments in social interactions contexts; 
Brock and Durlauf (2001c), while discussing a very different issue (economic growth) 
provide some general reasons why finding persuasive instrumental variables is extremely 
hard for theories (such as social interactions) which are “openended” i.e. theories whose 
  10internal logic does not exclude alternative theories of behavior from operating 
simultaneously.   
  This is one reason why we prefer the explicit modeling of self-selection when 
analyzing social interactions.  Self-selection does not represent an insuperable problem in 
drawing inferences on social interactions; as is well understood in the microeconometrics 
literature, consistent model estimates can be achieved in a variety of circumstances so 
long as self-selection is accounted for.   
From the perspective of social interactions work, the new idea that emerges when 
accounting for self-selection, and our second reason for advocating explicit modeling of 
self-selection, is that self-selection can help with identification.  Specifically, Brock and 
Durlauf (2001b) show that if one can model the self-selection correction, self-selection 
can contribute to identification by addressing aspects of the reflection problem.   
To understand why this is so, consider the original linear-in-means model.   
Suppose that  g g X Y =  so that if  ( ) ,, 0 ii g EX Y i g ε ∈ =  identification fails because of the 
reflection problem. As shown in Brock and Durlauf (2001b), self-selection may allow 
identification for this same linear-in-means model for two distinct reasons, depending on 
the structure of  ( ,, 0 ii g EX Y i g ε ∈= ) .  First, if  ( ) ( ,, ii g g EX Y i g m ε ∈= ) φ , i.e. self-
selection is determined by the expected average behavior of the neighborhood, then the 
selection correction induces nonlinearity into the model, thereby eliminating the 
possibility of a reflection problem outside of hairline cases.   
Alternatively, if  () ( ,, ii g i EX Y i g X ε ∈= ) φ , then the selection correction is an 
example of an individual-specific variable whose group level analogue does not appear in 
the  g Y  variables. The average of  ( ) ,, ii g EX Y i g ε ∈  within  g  will function as an 
additional  g X  variable that is not an element of  g Y ; the average value of 
( ,, ii g EX Y i g ε ∈ )  does not appear as a contextual effect in the model specification.   
Intuitively, self-selection provides additional information on an agent’s behavior which 
may be used to uncover the role that social interactions may have in influencing his 
decisions.  
  11While Brock and Durlauf (2001b) develop this general argument in the context of 
self-selection with respect to a binary choice, this idea can be generalized to multiple 
groups, as in Brock and Durlauf (2004a) and Ioannides and Zabel (2003b).  The potential 
for using self-selection to facilitate the identification of social interactions is illustrated in 
Ioannides and Zabel (2003b) who use selection corrections for residential neighborhoods 
to identify interdependences in housing demand.  
  So far, analyses of self-selection corrections as facilitators of identification have 
all employed parametric corrections, i.e. strong assumptions are made on the error 
distributions in both the selection equation and the behavioral model. An important next 
step in this work is the analysis of semiparametric selection corrections.  Another useful 
extension is the linking of this approach to identification with hedonic modeling, in 
which prices for group memberships such as residential housing presumably contain 
information on social interactions.  Methods to extract such information may be found in 
Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2002,2004) and Nesheim (2002).  
 
iii. unobserved group effects 
 
  A second important issue in social interactions models concerns the possibility of 
unobserved group effects. Suppose that the correct behavioral model is  
 
  ii g g g kc X d Y J m i ω αξ =+ + + + + (11) 
 
where  g α is a fixed effect. Without any restrictions on  g α , it is obvious that (11) is not 
identified, since for a given model one can always rewrite this original equation with  
*
g gg g dY Jm αα =+ + 0 d =   ,   and perfectly replicate the behavior of  0 J = i ω .  As in the 
case of self-selection, it is easy to identify cases where unobserved group effects are 
likely to matter, so that ignoring them will lead to noncredible inferences.  For example, 
if one wants to identify endogenous social interactions in a classroom, one needs to 
account for unobserved differences in teacher quality. 
  12  Unobserved group effects appear to be somewhat more difficult to address than 
self-selection since there is no natural way to model the effects using economic theory.  
One possible solution is to employ panel data and eliminate the fixed effects through 
differencing; this approach is suggested in Brock and Durlauf (2001b) and pursued in 
detail by Graham and Hahn (2004). While differencing can solve the fixed effects 
problem in principle, it is not clear that the sorts of fixed effects associated with groups 
are necessarily time invariant.  For example, teacher quality may vary across time due to 
changes in experience, health, etc.  Another route to achieving identification for this 
model is to assume that  g α  may be modeled as a random effect; this approach is 
developed in Graham (2005).  This assumption is relatively appealing in contexts such as 
random assignment of teachers to classrooms, as is studied by Graham. 
  For nonlinear models, it is possible to achieve partial identification even in cross-
sections.  This is shown for binary choice models in Brock and Durlauf (2004b). The 
basic idea of this approach is to ask whether there are shape restrictions one may place on 
the cross-group distribution function for  g α ,F α , that would allow for the data to reveal 
the presence of social interaction effects. What Brock and Durlauf (2004b) show is that 
for binary choice models where the endogenous social interactions parameter is large 
enough to induce multiple equilibria across groups, such shape restrictions exist. While 
the specific arguments are complicated, the basic ideas are relatively intuitive. For 
example, one version of this approach is to identify restrictions on F α  that imply that 
g m (as before, the expected average choice in a group) is monotonically increasing in  g Y  
when  .  One can then derive evidence by comparing expected average choices 
between pairs of groups, 
0 J =
g  and g′.  If one then observes cases where  g g mm ′ >  whereas 
g g YY ′ < , this can only be explained by   and  g g′ coordinating at equilibria that allow 
such a “pattern reversal.”  Another version of this approach involves exploiting the role 
of multiple equilibria in producing bimodality of the conditional distribution of  g m   
given  g Y , which extends and makes rigorous ideas that appear in Glaeser, Sacerdote, and 
Scheinkman (1996).  Pattern reversal findings of this type represent a form of partial 
identification (Manski (2003)) in that their presence does not provide an estimate of the 





4. Macroeconomic applications 
 
  In this section, we consider some possible uses of social interactions models in 
macroeconomic contexts.  To some extent, the arguments here will echo previous 
analyses that have claimed an important role for complementarities in aggregate analysis; 
Cooper (1999) provides a valuable survey of this perspective.  One feature that 
distinguishes our discussion is the emphasis on complementaries as a manifestation of 
social forces.  Further, our probabilistic formulation of social interactions creates a 
natural way to move from theory to empirical work, since the equilibrium joint 
probability measures in our social interactions models may be interpreted as likelihood 
functions from the econometric perspective. 
 
i. economic growth 
   
    One area where we believe social interactions may have important aggregate 
consequences is in terms of long term economic growth.  Within growth economics, there 
is a small but growing body of work that has focused on the role of “culture” in 
explaining cross-country growth differences.    On the empirical side, work of this type 
has focused on factors that range from trust (Knack and Keefer (1997)) to religious views 
(Barro and McCleary (2003)).  These papers are suggestive, but suffer from complicated 
identification problems (Brock and Durlauf (2001c), Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple 
(2004)). In essence, these findings are difficult to interpret because of the model 
uncertainty that plagues cross-country growth regressions with respect to the choice of 
variables and the measurement of social factors.  We believe that aggregate studies of this 
type are a useful starting point, but feel they need to be supplemented with studies using 
disaggregated data that permits a resolution of these types of problems.  We therefore 
  14interpret these aggregate studies as indicating that more careful analysis of social forces 
and growth is warranted. 
  A second source of evidence on the role of social factors in growth derives from 
economic history.  Landes (1998) provides a broad argument in favor of this perspective 
with many suggestive examples. Other studies represent careful empirical delineations of 
particular historical episodes or comparisons.  Important evidence of a role for social 
interactions in growth has been developed in Clark (1987); additional findings of this 
type appear in Wolcott and Clark (1999).  This paper compares productivity differences 
between cotton mills in New England versus those in Great Britain, Greece, Germany, 
Japan, India, and China for the period around 1910.  This comparison is especially 
interesting as the technology for cotton weaving did not differ across these countries and 
so one can engage in relatively straightforward comparisons of factories. Clark finds 
immense productivity differences between textile workers; around 1910, output per 
textile worker in New England was 1.5 times greater than in Great Britain, 2.3 times 
greater than in Germany, and 6 times greater than in Japan.  
  How can one interpret such a finding? One possibility, which is the basis of 
Clark’s analysis, relates to social norms and effort.  Clark is able to argue persuasively 
that these differences are not due to managerial or worker quality, but are due to what he 
calls “local culture.”   This type of analysis is a natural candidate for a formal social 
interactions type analysis.  Work such as Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (1999), which 
provides a model of social norms and welfare/work decisions, could be readily adapted to 
this.  More generally, we see social interactions as providing an underpinning for efforts 
to formally model culture.  For example, it seems reasonable to suppose that culture is to 
some extent a manifestation of how individuals define their identities, in the sense of 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) or Fang and Loury (2004).  To the extent that social 
interactions-type phenomena such as peer influences or conformity effects help determine 
which identities become salient in a population, social interactions can play a role in 
producing cultural differences.  Social interactions approaches would be of particular 
interest if one could identify substantial within-country variation in productivity, so that 
the cultural differences identified by Clark are in fact generated locally. 
  15  Moving to new growth theory, one can identify a number of models which have 
social interactions components.  One class of models focuses on the formation of trading 
networks that link different economic actors and the concomitant implications for 
industrialization and development.  By way of background, Kirman (1983) was the first 
to show that small differences in the process by which direct bilateral connections 
between economic actors form can produce, when markets represent groups of actors that 
are directly or indirectly linked, either economy-wide markets or many groups of small 
markets; the implications of these different market sizes for macroeconomic outcomes 
such as overall levels of risk sharing are explored in Ioannides (1990).  These ideas have 
proven useful in understanding the expansion of market size and its implications for 
economic development.  A particularly interesting analysis is due to Kelly (1997) who 
models the takeoff to industrialization as a type of phase transition.  Alternatively, one 
can use social interactions-type models to understand how local spillover effects can 
affect growth. This approach is taken in Durlauf (1993), where sector-specific spillovers 
can produce a phase transition from underdevelopment to industrialization in response to 
small increases in productivity.  
  In considering the roles of social norms and trading networks as mechanisms 
explaining industrialization and growth, we are led to conjecture that one can develop a 
vision of the development process in which social or cultural norms and preferences 
diffuse because of trading relationships and eventually dominate a population.  To be 
clear, one needs to be careful about what this process encumbers.  De Vries (1994) has 
argued that, in understanding the Industrial Revolution, one needs to account for the 
“industrious revolution” by which labor supply dramatically increased in England 
beginning in the 1600’s.  De Vries’ claim has been challenged by Voth (1998) who finds 
that increases in hours worked occurred in the middle 1700’s rather than earlier and by 
Clark and van der Werf (1998) who find little evidence of increased work rates in 
England before 1850.  We are sympathetic with Clark’s focus on effort while working as 
opposed to hours worked per se.  But for either measure, one can envision the diffusion 
of new work attitudes and behaviors as a dynamic social interaction process. And we 
regard the debates over the industrious revolution as indicative of a role for more formal 
identification analysis in disentangling different types of social interactions that may be 
  16present.  While we of course have no reason to think that there exist historical data sets 
that would allow estimation of the models we have described, the identification results 
provide clues as to what sort of evidence could help in resolving disagreements.  In fact, 
we believe that the development of a complete evaluation of evidence for social 
interactions may well require considerable attention to evidence sources such as historical 






  At first glance, it is less clear how social interactions approaches can influence the 
study of economic fluctuations.  One perhaps trivial reason for this is that the primary 
body of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that are used in current 
macroeconomic theory have not been developed in ways in which there are natural routes 
for embodying social interactions.  While recent work on DSGE models has made 
important advances in modeling individual heterogeneity, Krusell and Smith (1998) is an 
exemplar, DSGE models have not generally developed in directions where social 
interactions are a natural addition to existing microfoundations. 
  That being said, there are important strands of the modern macroeconomic 
literature where social interactions models may prove to be useful.  As well reviewed in 
Cooper (1999), there has been considerable work in macroeconomics that has attempted 
to use the idea of complementarities in a range of contexts.  One strand concerns the role 
of increasing returns to scale in propagating aggregate fluctuations.  As developed for 
example in Benhabib and Farmer (1994), increasing returns to scale may lead to 
indeterminacy in the equilibrium paths of macroeconomic aggregates, this means that a 
given specification of the microeconomic structure of the economy, while leading to a 
unique balanced growth path, is consistent with multiple paths for output, consumption, 
etc. One important implication of increasing returns and indeterminacy is that business 
cycle fluctuations may be induced by self-fulfilling expectations.  Focusing specifically 
on the “animal spirits” of investors, Farmer and Guo (1994), engage in a number of 
  17calibration exercises to demonstrate that these effects can capture a number of observed 
dynamic relationships in the US economy. 
  We conjecture that the introductions of social interactions into some aspects of 
business cycle models can strengthen the microfoundations for these types of results.  At 
one level, we would argue that social interactions models can help to elucidate the 
microfoundations that have already been identified.  For example, suppose there are 
social interactions in the labor force participation decision.  If so, then the potential for 
phase transition in social interactions models can induce nonconvexities in the aggregate 
supply schedule.    
Alternatively, to the extent that one wishes to understand animal spirits of 
investors, work such as Brock (1993) suggests that a natural way to understand shifts in 
investor beliefs is via the interdependences in these beliefs; formal mechanisms for this 
are described in Brock and Hommes (1997).  In our view, understanding waves of 
optimism and pessimism in the macroeconomy is critical in understanding short term and 
medium term fluctuations. We further believe that interdependence of beliefs play an 
essential role in generating these waves.  Put differently, phenomena such as “irrational 
exuberance,” to employ Robert Shiller’s (2001) term, emerge, we would argue, precisely 
because individual beliefs are highly interdependent, so that small outside changes can be 
magnified up into large fluctuations on average. 
Indeed the whole literature on “sunspot” effects (i.e. effects of “extrinsic 
uncertainty”) could benefit from the introduction of social interactions.  A problem with 
the sunspots literature is that while one can demonstrate theoretically that sunspot effects 
can have macro level effects, existing sunspot models do not demonstrate why a cross 
sectional form of the law of large numbers might not apply to “wash out” the effects of 
such sunspots at the macro level.  To put it another way, if there do not exist social 
interactions linking individual beliefs, there seems to be no reason why each individual 
micro agent would condition on the same sunspot variable when there is no intrinsic 
fundamental reason why that particular variable should matter.  But methods such as 
Brock (1993) and Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b,2004a) should be adaptable to produce 
tractable macro models where the cross sectional law of large numbers breaks down and 
where tiny outside effects cause explosive shifts in macro aggregates.  We believe, for 
  18example, that this could be one way to give plausible microfoundations to the emergence 
of lock-in to one particular sunspot variable even though there is no intrinsic fundamental 
reason that particular sunspot variable should command economy-wide attention.   It 
could also be a useful way to model the emergence and persistence of irrational 
exuberance. 
  The potential for social interactions to induce correlated behaviors in a population 
suggests a second area where the approach may have value in understanding business 
cycles: the role of individual-specific shocks in affecting aggregate outcomes.  The 
possibility that interdependences in individual decisions can convert individual shocks 
into aggregate fluctuations was originally studied in Jovanovic (1987), who identified the 
key role of complementarities in such a transformation, but this idea has not been nearly 
as much developed as we think is appropriate.  Horvath (1998,2000), using log linear 
models of the type pioneered by Long and Plosser (1983), extended this type of analysis 
by focusing on input/output-type relationships between sectors of the economy and 
showed how it is possible for sector-specific shocks to affect aggregate output; 
calibration evidence showed this approach can match various moments of aggregate US 
data. The marginal value of this approach in understanding fluctuations has been 
criticized by Dupor (1999) who provides a number of observational equivalence 
theorems between one sector and multi-sector models of fluctuations.    
We see a role for social interaction in elucidating the aggregate implications of 
sector-specific shocks.  Social interactions can provide mechanisms by which individual 
sectors are interrelated.  We would imagine that animal spirits are subject to various 
intersectoral dependences that mimic the technological interdependences that lie at the 
heart of Horvath’s analysis.  Further, the social interactions models we have described 
have the important feature that they are intrinsically nonlinear.  Nonlinearities should, we 
believe, break the observational equivalence that Dupor has identified and as such may 
lead to sector-specific shocks generating aggregate fluctuations quite different from their 
aggregate shock counterparts.  Of course, it may be that nonlinear single sector models 
can reestablish Dupor’s observational equivalence result.  
Recent work on the aggregation of idiosyncratic shocks is close to our vision of 
how research of this type might proceed.  In a very interesting paper, Gabaix (2004) 
  19shows that in a world of fat-tailed firm size distributions, idiosyncratic firm-level shocks 
can aggregate up to non-trivial aggregate fluctuations at the GDP level, whereas in a 
world of thin-tailed firm size distributions, this can not happen.   He argues that 
idiosyncratic shocks to the 100 largest firms account for about 40% of US output 
volatility. Gabaix uses the statistical theory behind fat-tailed distributions to get a factor 
of 1/  for the scaling of aggregate volatility rather than the usual scaling of  .  
One can see that 1/   “diversifies away” idiosyncratic fluctuations at a much slower 
rate than does  .  While this is very speculative, we conjecture that it may be 
fruitful for future research in macroeconomics to couple a mechanism like Gabaix’s with 
the presence of social interactions at various levels in the macroeconomy in order to get a 
more complete understanding of how idiosyncratic shocks can aggregate to 
macroeconomic volatility via the emergence of fat-tailed distributions at various levels of 
disaggregation.  For example, intrafirm shocks may, via intrafirm social interactions, 
produce the fat tails needed for Gabaix’s interfirm analysis.  We believe this research 
route may be promising because we have already shown how social interactions can 
magnify very small shocks into large ones (Brock (1993), Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b); 
see also Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) who describe links between social 
interactions and excess volatility of averages) and so regard social interactions as a 





  Third, we see a potential role for social interactions in understanding what is still 
the major business cycle event of the modern economy−the Great Depression.  While the 
idea of the Great Depression as a bad equilibrium has longstanding lineage, beautifully 
analyzed in Leijonhufvud (1968), with a few exceptions, notably Cooper and Ejarque 
(1995) and Dagsvik and Jovanovic (1994), this interpretation has fallen out of current 
macroeconomic discourse. The state-of-the art analysis of the Great Depression is 
arguably Cole and Ohanian (2004) which focuses on the role of bad government policies 
in generating persistence in the Depression; coordination failure/multiple equilibrium 
issues do not arise in their treatment.  We believe that social interactions models, by 
providing a rigorous mathematical foundation for modeling how heterogeneous 
populations can exhibit phase transitions into locally stable, collectively undesirable 
equilibia, can help develop an approach to understanding the Great Depression in line 
  20with the Leijonhufvud vision. Whether this vision is empirically viable, of course, 
remains to be seen.  For our purposes, what matters is that there has yet to be a 
quantitative delineation of the coordination failure view that can be compared to 
approaches such as Cole and Ohanian.  The formal statistical mechanical models that 
have appeared in the social interactions literature provide a possible way of producing 
such a comparison and perhaps even an integration of these differing perspectives. 
  Finally, we would observe that social interactions have a role to play in 
understanding the interactions of business cycles and income distribution and as such can 
contribute to the research program developed in Krusell and Smith (1998) and elsewhere.  
One case where this seems plausible concerns the distribution of unemployment across 
different groups.  As shown in theoretical work such as Montgomery (1990) and Oomes 
(2003), group heterogeneity will emerge in unemployment rates via network effects; the 
empirical importance of these effects is shown in Topa (2001).  In this regard, Conley 
and Topa (2002) is of particular interest in its efforts to empirically compare different 
types of groups spatial, ethnic, etc. − −as the relevant group in which social interactions 
are created.     
More generally, we think the sorts of factors that underlie social interactions 
models peer effects, information spillovers, social norms, etc. − − are an important 
complement to the imperfect risk sharing that is generally at the heart of macroeconomic 
models of income inequality.  There is a dichotomy between macroeconomic models of 
inequality, with their emphasis on complete modeling of the evolution of the income 
distribution with relatively narrow views of the determinants of individual 
decisionmaking, and microeconomic models of inequality which contain richer 
conceptions of individual choice, but do so at the expense of less developed ways of 
modeling populations.  The mathematical models underlying social interactions analysis 





  21  While we have great confidence in the importance of social interactions in 
explaining a range of socioeconomic phenomena, we wish to reemphasize that this case 
has yet to be established by a consensus of empirical evidence.  The empirical literature 
on social interactions is young and has not fully incorporated the insights of the relevant 
econometric literature.  So one cannot make overly strong empirical claims for the 
importance of social interactions even in the microeconomic contexts in which social 
interactions seem most plausible.   
Still, we strongly believe that in many macroeconomic contexts, social 
interactions plausibly matter and can affect how one thinks about the generative 
mechanisms underlying both long run and short run macroeconomic outcomes.   At this 
stage, our claims are, to repeat, essentially speculative.  Whether this belief is correct can 
only be resolved through new research.  What we have tried to argue here is that expected 
payoff from this research warrants its undertaking. 
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